Tower Block Disaster

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reohn2
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Re: Grenfell

Postby reohn2 » 29 Jan 2020, 5:43pm

pwa wrote:I am less interested in who is to blame, and more interested in the various decision making processes the led to a tower block being encased in a combustible material. You would have thought that the first question to be asked of any prospective cladding would be "Will it burn?", and that an answer in the affirmative would consign it to the bin. Because tower blocks around the UK have similar cladding the problem must originate high up, and possibly in Government.

Damn right it originates high up,the very top of high up!
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Vorpal
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby Vorpal » 29 Jan 2020, 7:31pm

There is an analysis method often used after a disaster of this magnitude called Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT). Tha main reason such an analysis method exists is that some of the causes and contributing factors in a complex incident arise from organisational issues.
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Bonefishblues
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby Bonefishblues » 29 Jan 2020, 7:45pm

100%JR wrote:
Bonefishblues wrote:You are implying a conspiracy of some proportion.

If however, someone knowingly clad that building in flammable materials, or was negligent in failing to exercise their duty of care, then there's no bus big enough, or heavy enough to throw them underneath. I reckon that the public can readily understand the two different scenarios.


Well,well,well........

Here is my complete post, which in turn was a response to your assertion that I was, IIRC, throwing the LFB under a bus:
Bonefishblues wrote:You are implying a conspiracy of some proportion.

Here's my view, hugely condensed.

Nobody is criticising the ordinary fire fighters, their commitment or their bravery. What is being examined is an adherence to an obviously failed policy for far too long, way beyond the point at which it should have been screamingly obvious that it wasn't going to keep people safe - because it already wasn't.

When the senior officer appears at an Enquiry and makes statements such as those, it does raise questions as to what the reason is for that. These are seasoned, experienced, brave people, at least when they were active firefighters. Their mission was first and foremost to protect life, they're not fools, clearly, so there's some other dynamic at play that's not only worth examining, it must be examined. It's absolutely not about throwing anyone under a bus, but it's a statement of fact that many more people died than should have done on that night.

If however, someone knowingly clad that building in flammable materials, or was negligent in failing to exercise their duty of care, then there's no bus big enough, or heavy enough to throw them underneath. I reckon that the public can readily understand the two different scenarios.

Bonefishblues
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby Bonefishblues » 29 Jan 2020, 7:46pm

Vorpal wrote:There is an analysis method often used after a disaster of this magnitude called Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT). Tha main reason such an analysis method exists is that some of the causes and contributing factors in a complex incident arise from organisational issues.

...and often multiple issues coinciding, I guess.

reohn2
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby reohn2 » 29 Jan 2020, 9:13pm

The problems of this type of cladding were well known in high rise apartment blocks,along with UPVc window frames melting in fires,well before Grenfell.
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reohn2
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby reohn2 » 20 Jun 2020, 11:37am

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thirdcrank
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby thirdcrank » 20 Jun 2020, 1:14pm

Re: The Grenfell Tower Inquiry

I've been reading through the comments since the Phase 1 report was published.

It's a long report (856 pages) and even the executive summary runs to 32 pages. Inevitably, the "breaking news" media reports concentrated on "eye-catching" points, without the depth of analysis the report merits, and some of the comments above are understandably, therefore, second hand. Also, there seems to have been a fair bit of backside covering by interested parties.

When the report was published, I downloaded it in full and carefully read the first three volumes. The fourth volume is a compilation of obituaries of the deceased which I could not complete reading. Although there's a lot to go at, I found it to be clearly written and easy to understand. For anybody really interested in finding out what is now known, I'd recommend reading the executive summary and then perhaps looking at parts of the full report if they wonder what the evidence is to support what's been said in the summary. I will say that the detailed evidence is harrowing but it supports the report's findings.

Few come out well. There were many individual acts of heroism by firefighters. The duty police inspector recognized from the outset that police resources would be needed from across the capital and organised that. (ie did his job.) A manager from the gas company which supplied the tower realised the gas supply needed turning off. He attended on his own initiative and did that. Not just a matter of turning a tap, but quite a lengthy stint digging up streets, based on his personal knowledge of the supply system.

On the point as to whether the inquiry was qualified to reach certain conclusions, Sir Martin Bick-Moore explains in detail how the evidence heard either justifies conclusions or needs to be considered further.

It's really regrettable that lockdown seems to have stopped progress to the next stage. A forced change of chair would be really undesirable.

(It's a while since I read this, and I've not gone back to it.)

https://www.grenfelltowerinquiry.org.uk/phase-1-report

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simonineaston
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby simonineaston » 20 Jun 2020, 2:01pm

My worry is that inspite of Bick-Moore's stated intention to be thorough and forensic, at the end of the day, the corporate lawyers at the respective companies will simply play Pass The Parcel so well that nobody will be held to account. It's already happening with the many blocks still equipped with unsuitable cladding. Resonsibility is passed round and rund and round and in the end, the tennants are being asked to pay for replacement, which is unpleasant to say the least as these folk are the least liable in the chain of involvement. Those that bought leasehold properties relyed on surveyors to alert them to possible issues and those surveyors in turn, probably scanned the property fire reg.s documentation briefly, on the assumption that they had been maintained according to agreed regulations etc. etc. in complete ignorance of the fact that the cladding manufacturers had busily sold discounted product, with even their sales person possibly unaware of the true nature of the materials involved. Buck passing at its slickest and most dangerous.
ttfn, Simon in Easton
(currently enjoying a Moulton TSR & a nano Brompton...)

thirdcrank
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby thirdcrank » 20 Jun 2020, 2:24pm

Before the inquiry got started, Sir Martin Bick-Moore was the target of a lot of criticism and queries about his suitability for the role, not least because he was an old white man and a member of the establishment. That was on top of all the manoeuvring by those involved and their lawyers. It's my impression that, at the very least, "It's all gone quiet over there" because of the painstakingly thorough approach he took.

It's in the nature of our legal system that the wheels grind slowly, especially when there are both major criminal and civil matters to be decided.

I cannot see how it can be part of his remit to decide those things and enforce those decisions.

slowster
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Re: Tower Block Disaster

Postby slowster » 20 Jun 2020, 10:19pm

thirdcrank wrote:On the point as to whether the inquiry was qualified to reach certain conclusions, Sir Martin Bick-Moore explains in detail how the evidence heard either justifies conclusions

Much of the report's criticism (extract below) of the LFB for its failure to plan, prepare and train for full evacuations in high rise rise buildings like Grenfell Tower was based on Generic Risk Assessment 3.2, a document issued by UK Government's Chief Fire & Rescue Adviser, which set out how UK Fire Authorities needed to address fire fighting in high rise buildings.

Generic Risk Assessment 3.2 appears to have been accepted at face value by the inquiry, whereas I would question whether those responsible for that document knew that the necessary technical guidance and training material/resources for undertaking full evacuations in high rise rise buildings did not exist.

In other words, the current and former Chief Fire & Rescue Advisers who issued that document and its revisions are/were all very senior fire officers. They all should have known from their own personal experience as senior fire officers serving in UK Fire Authorities, latterly typically as a Chief Fire Officer, that there was no such national guidance or training material.

I would like to have seen all the Chief Fire & Rescue Advisers in office when Generic Risk Assessment 3.2 was issued and later revised, give evidence to the inquiry regarding why they did not identify a lack of suitable and sufficient guidance and training on full evacuations in high rise rise buildings as something which specifically needed to be addressed if UK brigades were to be able to comply with Generic Risk Assessment 3.2.

That said, the current and former most senior officers in the LFB (as the brigade with the greatest exposure to high rise buldings), should themselves have identified the absence of the necessary guidance to enable them to fulfil those particular requirements of Generic Risk Assessment 3.2, and then engaged with the Chief Fire & Rescue Adviser, the Home Office and other UK Fire Brigades on a plan to develop suitable guidance and training.

27.1 The purpose of Generic Risk Assessment (GRA) 3.2 was to assist fire and rescue services in drawing up their own assessments of risk to meet their statutory obligations under the relevant Health and Safety at Work legislation. It recommended that contingency plans should be drawn up for individual premises, which should cover the spread of fire beyond the compartment of origin, the possible need for multiple rescues and the need for an operational evacuation plan in case “stay put” became untenable. It follows that fire and rescue services were expected to provide those who might become incident commanders at fires in high-rise buildings with training in evacuation and casualty removal tactics, as well as training to enable them to recognise when a full or partial evacuation has become necessary.

27. 2 GRA 3.2 covers a substantial amount of ground relevant to the LFB’s knowledge of the risks at Grenfell Tower and their operations on the night of the fire itself which are examined elsewhere in this report. For present purposes, it clearly contemplated that total evacuation of a high-rise building should be an important part of any fire and rescue service’s contingency plan for such a building. I refer to pages 15, 16, 17, 19-20, 27, 29 and 49 of GRA 3.2. I need only quote three passages.

a. Page 17: “Contingency plans for particular premises should cover:
• fire spread beyond the compartment of origin and the potential for multiple rescues
an operational evacuation plan being required in the event the “Stay Put” policy becomes untenable
...
• alternative communication arrangements to overcome any radio ‘blind spots’”

b. Pages 19-20: “Training, which will cover high rise incidents must include:
...
• Evacuation and casualty removal tactics. Incident Commanders should understand when a partial or full evacuation strategy might become necessary in a residential building where a “Stay Put” policy is normally in place
.”

c. Page 29: “The advice offered to callers to remain in their property during fire survival guidance calls must be re-evaluated throughout an incident. Where circumstances make it necessary, an Incident Commander may need to consider changing the advice given. For example, callers may need to be advised to leave their property or to be guided from it by firefighters. The Incident Commander should also consider making use of all available systems within the building to communicate with occupants.”