Bailii is usually a good place to look as its free although it seems not to have it on a quick look.
*441 Crank v Brooks
Queen's Bench Division
16 May 1980
[1980] R.T.R. 441
Waller LJ and Stephen Brown J
16 May 1980
Pedestrian crossing—Precedence—Pedal cyclist on foot, pushing bicycle and using crossing—Whether ‘foot passenger’— Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 s 23(1)(5) — Zebra Pedestrian Crossings Regulations 1971 reg 8
Section 23 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 provides:
‘(1) The … Minister may make regulations with respect to … precedence of vehicles and foot passengers … at … crossings … (5) A person who contravenes any regulations made under this section shall be liable … to a fine…’
Regulation 8 of the Zebra Pedestrian Crossings Regulations 1971 provides:
‘Every foot passenger on the carriageway within the limits of an uncontrolled zebra crossing shall have precedence within those limits over any vehicle and the driver of the vehicle shall accord such precedence to the foot passenger, if the foot passenger is on the carriageway within those limits before the vehicle or any part thereof has come on to the carriageway within those limits…’
A cyclist, who was on foot pushing her bicycle on a ‘Zebra’ pedestrian crossing, intending to cross to the other side of the road, was knocked down by a motor car driven by the defendant. He was charged with failing to accord precedence to a foot passenger, contrary to regulation 8 of the Zebra Pedestrian Crossings Regulation 1971 and section 23(5) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 . On a submission of no case to answer on the ground that a cyclist pushing a bicycle was not a ‘foot passenger’, the justices were of opinion that a cyclist could not become a foot passenger at will, and they dismissed the information.
On appeal by the prosecutor:
Held, allowing the appeal, that a person on foot and pushing a bicycle throughout the time of using a ‘Zebra’ pedestrian crossing was a ‘foot passenger’ within regulation 8 (pp 442L–443A) and the fact that a bicycle was being pushed at the time was immaterial (p 443B); that, therefore, the justices had erred and the case would be remitted to them with a direction to continue the hearing.
No case is refered to in the judgment or was cited in argument .
Case stated by Cheshire Justices sitting at Sandbach
The defendant, Clive Brooks, was summoned to appear before the justices on information of the prosecutor, Brian Crank, a police inspector for the Cheshire Constabulary, for that he on 14 March 1978 at Elworth in Cheshire, being the driver of a motor vehicle, namely, a motor car in London Road, did fail to accord precedence to a foot passenger on the carriageway within the limits of an uncontrolled crossing, such foot passenger having been within those limits before the vehicle or any part thereof had come within those limits, contrary to regulation 8 of the Zebra Pedestrian Crossings Regulations 1971 and section 23(5) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 *442 .
[ The justices heard the information on 11 July 1978 and ] … found the following facts. A witness had cycled to a post office situated in London Road, Elworth, Cheshire from her home. The witness having visited the post office walked to the pavement edge pushing a bicycle with the intention of crossing the road by means of the pedestrian crossing situated near the post office. The witness while pushing her bicycle on the pedestrian crossing was knocked down by a motor car being driven by the defendant. The intention of the witness was to remount the bicycle on the other side of the road to continue her journey home.
On a submission of no case to answer it was contended on behalf of the defendant that a person pushing a bicycle was not a ‘foot passenger’. The following authorities were quoted:
McKerrell v Robertson, 1956 SLT 290
Wilkinson's Road Traffic Offences 9th ed (1977)p 450.
The justices, having heard the contentions from both the defendant's solicitor and the prosecutor, preferred the view that a cyclist could not become a ‘foot passenger’ at will. They, therefore, dismissed the information on the basis of that submission.
The prosecutor appealed.
The question for the opinion of the court was whether the justices were right in law in dismissing the information on the submission that a person pushing a bicycle was not a ‘foot passenger’.
Representation
Roger Bell for the prosecutor.
The defendant did not appear and was not represented.
JUDGMENT
WALLER LJ
This is an appeal by way of case stated from a decision of Cheshire Justices sitting at Sandbach on 11 July 1978.
The defendant was summoned for a breach of regulation 8 of the Zebra Pedestrian Crossing Regulations 1971 and section 23 of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 , for that he on 14 March 1978 at Elworth in Cheshire, being the driver of a motor vehicle, namely, a motor car in London Road, did fail to accord precedence to a foot passenger on the carriageway within the limits of an uncontrolled crossing, such foot passenger having been within those limits before the vehicle or any part thereof had come within those limits.
The justices found that a witness had cycled to a post office in London Road. Having visited the post office she walked to the pavement edge pushing a bicycle with the intention of crossing the road by means of the pedestrian crossing situated near the post office. The witness while pushing her bicycle on the pedestrian crossing was knocked down by a motor car being driven by the defendant. The intention of the witness was to remount the bicycle on the other side of the road to continue her journey home.
The justices accepted a submission that there was no case to answer and they ask this court's opinion whether they were right in law in dismissing the information on the submission that a person pushing a bicycle was not a ‘foot passenger’.
In my judgment a person who is walking across a pedestrian crossing *443 pushing a bicycle, having started on the pavement on one side on her feet and not on the bicycle, and going across pushing the bicycle with both feet on the ground so to speak is clearly a ‘foot passenger.’ If for example she had been using it as a scooter by having one foot on the pedal and pushing herself along, she would not have been a ‘foot passenger’. But the fact that she had the bicycle in her hand and was walking does not create any difference from a case where she is walking without a bicycle in her hand. I regard it as unarguable the finding that she was not a foot passenger.
I would allow this appeal and answer the question that the justices were not right in law in dismissing the information.
STEPHEN BROWN J
I agree
Reported by Mrs Rachel Davies Barrister-at-Law
*444
Representation
Solicitors for the prosecutor: Sharpe , Pritchard & Co for E C Woodcock , Chester
Appeal allowed. Case remitted to the justices with a direction to continue the hearing. Order for payment of prosecutor's costs out of central funds